Confusion abounds over exactly why the United States started the current war on Iran, what its strategic objectives are, and what the war’s likely outcome and long-term consequences will be. Major military operations are necessarily complex and unpredictable; hence the term “fog of war.” However, the evolving and frequently inconsistent explanations by the Trump administration along with President Trump’s erratic threats, actions and increasingly unhinged rants compound the inevitable uncertainty.
Two accounts–one unverified but plausible, the other clearly true–do shed light on how the war came about. Both are troubling.
A remarkable New York Times story offers a detailed narrative of the presidential decision-making process. It suggests that the pivotal event was a February 11 White House meeting at which Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu made a “hard sell” for the war to Trump and a small circle of his advisors. Netanyahu insisted that the war could be completed quickly and would result in ousting Iran’s radical regime. He discounted the risk that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz or attack neighboring countries. After listening to Netanyahu’s pitch, Trump supposedly replied “sounds good to me.”
Of Trump’s advisors, only Defense Secretary Hegseth shared his enthusiasm; the rest expressed varying degrees of skepticism. Over the following days, U.S. intelligence officials assessed Netanyahu’s prediction of an uprising leading to regime change as “detached from reality” and “farcical.” Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine warned Trump that a major campaign against Iran would drastically deplete U.S. weapons stockpiles and emphasized the risk of Iran blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Vice President Vance opposed the operation outright.
The timetable for reaching a decision was pushed up by intelligence that Iran’s ayatollah would be vulnerable to assassination on a particular day. In the end, none of Trump’s advisors pushed back significantly against his initial inclination to go to war despite their reservations. According to the article, all deferred to Trump’s instinct that the war would be a quick and decisive win.
If even the gist of this account is true, it presents a disturbing picture: Trump launched a major military action based largely on his own instincts, favoring the rosy scenario pushed by Netanyahu over cautionary assessments by military and intelligence officials as well as mainly skepticism by the few advisors he consulted. While its accuracy can’t be established definitively, this account does align with Trump’s consistent tendency to operate mainly by whim with little interest in or tolerance for opposing views.
The second disturbing feature, which is clearly true, is the absence of any consultation with Congress. The Constitution explicitly vests the power to declare war in Congress. Over time, war powers have shifted dramatically from Congress to the president. Nevertheless, the total absence of congressional participation in this case is striking. Law Professors Bob Bauer and Jack Goldsmith describe the Iran war as “among the most consequential [congressionally] unauthorized presidential uses of force in all of American history,” probably second only to the Korean War, and also “a new nadir in the decline of Congress’s check on presidential war.”
The lack of congressional input is more than an abstract legal concern. Bauer and Goldsmith note that the constitutional authority to declare war was assigned to Congress “to ensure a democratic check on unilateral presidential military adventurism.” They see a direct connection between the absence of consultation with Congress before or since the Iran war began and the volatility with which the administration has conducted it. They submit that “the need to justify and explain [the war] to government leaders outside the presidential bubble might have surfaced the many problems that have become apparent over the last month and counseled a steadier course.”
Nothing illustrates this better than the conundrum over Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Most experts regard this tactic by Iran as entirely foreseeable. General Caine reportedly highlighted the risk to Trump, but Trump brushed it aside and his “bubble” offered little resistance. They now face a variant of Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn rule (“you break it, you own it”). One expert submits that the crisis Trump created regarding the Strait may have caused the war to morph from one of choice to one of necessity.
Trump’s varying responses to the closure have ranged from asserting that reopening the Strait is someone else’s problem, to saying it will somehow reopen itself, to making the reopening an essential part of any settlement of the war. He has now ordered the U.S. military to conduct its own blockade of the Strait.
How the war turns out remains to be seen, but all outward signs along with the above reporting suggest that Trump started it with no coherent, realistic strategy. Moreover, he is operating without either internal or congressional guardrails.
Clearly, the U.S. military is performing at a high level; perhaps the war will achieve strategic outcomes justifying its huge costs and other consequences. However, surely this is not the way to initiate and conduct a major war. The track record of U.S. military actions over recent decades is not good even when undertaken by more conventional presidents with more serious advisors than the ever more bizarre Trump and his gang of sycophantic enablers.