House Appropriators Kneecap GAO, Along with Themselves and the Rest of Congress

The House Appropriations Committee recently reported a bill that cuts the budget of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) by almost 50 percent. The bill also limits GAO’s ability to bring lawsuits specifically authorized by law to enforce the Impoundment Control Act.

In a June 25 letter to Committee members, GAO’s head, Comptroller General Gene Dodaro, advised that a cut of this magnitude “would have grave, pervasive effects in undermining our support of the Congress.” Specifically, he said it would require an immediate staff reduction of at least 2,200 (or 63 percent) and eventually more, “leaving GAO with only skeletal staffing.” He went on to detail many aspects of GAO’s work that would be jeopardized.

According to a Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee fact sheet, this drastic budget cut was intended to “curtail the agency’s self-directed, liberal initiatives” and make its work more “reflective of congressional priorities.”

This explanation is breathtakingly disingenuous and obviously pretextual. Almost all of GAO’s work (about 95 percent) is done pursuant to specific congressional requests and statutory mandates. What little self-directed work the agency does also directly supports Congress. The prime example is GAO’s biennial “high-risk” list, which identifies government programs and activities most vulnerable to fraud, waste, and mismanagement and thus provides Congress a roadmap for oversight and reform legislation. This project has received bipartisan praise from Congress for decades.

The notion that there is anything “liberal” (or “conservative”) about GAO’s work, self-directed or otherwise, is absolute nonsense. GAO has a longstanding and unblemished record of producing fact-based, objective, nonpartisan analyses. Of necessity, GAO frequently addresses politically controversial subjects; its conclusions are, of course, fair game for debate. However, its work has long been accepted by all sides in Congress as unbiased politically and ideologically.

Nor is there any cost-savings justification for the huge budget cut. The Committee’s cut to GAO is greatly disproportionate to reductions in other legislative branch budget categories. Moreover, any cut to GAO’s budget actually costs taxpayers. GAO’s work regularly results in taxpayer savings that far exceed its budget. In fiscal year 2024, it achieved $67.5 billion in financial benefits for the federal government—a return of about $76 for every dollar invested in GAO.

What, then, is the real reason for this draconian budget cut?

Spearheaded by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Russell Vought, the Trump Administration is intent on seizing the power of the purse from Congress through aggressive and probably often illegal impoundments–i.e., refusals to spend appropriations enacted by Congress. But the Impoundment Control Act limits the executive branch’s ability to impound and assigns important investigative and enforcement powers to GAO. This includes authority to sue the executive branch to compel release of illegally impounded funds.

Clearly, OMB seeks to hamstring GAO’s ability to carry out its duties under the Act, particularly to bring enforcement suits. (This oversight-averse Administration probably sees limiting GAO’s ability to carry out its functions in general as an added benefit.)  All this is cynical but unsurprising. What’s surprising–actually shocking–is that OMB has successfully enlisted House appropriators in its scheme. The appropriators are apparently willing to decimate their own “watchdog” agency in order to prevent it from defending their own duly enacted appropriations from illegal impoundment by the executive branch.

What’s happening here is particularly distressing on three levels. First, it’s grossly unfair to GAO and its staff. They are being punished not for straying from their mission to conduct “self-directed, liberal initiatives” as the appropriators falsely claim, but for carrying out their explicit obligations under the law. The Impoundment Control Act requires GAO to investigate and report to Congress on impoundments and specifically assigns it authority to bring enforcement actions when necessary.

Second, the proposed budget cut would cause significant harm to the public. GAO is the only wholly independent, nonpartisan source of executive branch oversight within the federal government. As noted, its work annually saves taxpayers billions of dollars. GAO’s recommendations also achieve substantial non-monetary benefits in terms of increased efficiency and effectiveness of government operations.

Third, curbing GAO not only undercuts the appropriators’ own interests (or what they should be) but undermines the rest of Congress, which values and makes heavy use of GAO. GAO averages 627 new congressional requests for studies each year from leadership, committees, and statutory mandates. Almost all congressional committees and over half of all subcommittees regularly request work from GAO. The House appropriators’ budget cut would prevent GAO from performing much of this work.

For years, Congress has been ceding its authority to the executive branch, thereby threatening the system of separation of powers and checks and balances on which the health of our democracy depends. For its own sake and the sake of the country, it needs to reassert itself as a coequal branch of government.  

The last thing Congress should do in this regard is shoot itself in the foot by weakening its own resources. Indeed, it should not only reject the severe cut to GAO’s budget but strengthen GAO as an arm of Congress by taking control of the appointment of the Comptroller General. (It should do the same for the Librarian of Congress given the vital services provided by the Congressional Research Service.)

Hopefully, Congress will come to its senses and act in its own institutional interests and the public interest by reversing this perverse, ill-considered attack on GAO.