More on the Comptroller General Appointment

Along with many others, I’ve already written about the Trump administration’s effort to assume control of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) by circumventing the law and pressuring Congress to install its hand-picked candidate as Comptroller General (CG).[1]See here and here  Without repeating all that’s been said, it’s worth reiterating some key points.

Congress, not the president, should exercise primary responsibility for selecting the head of its own watchdog agency

The CG was designated a presidential appointee for reasons that were relevant when GAO was created over a century ago but make no sense today. Given GAO’s contemporary status as exclusively a legislative branch agency, there is no reason why the CG should remain a presidential appointee and every reason why Congress should take over the appointment of this key congressional agent. Indeed, Congress has enacted or is in the process of enacting bipartisan legislation to assume appointing authority over the heads of all other legislative branch agencies.

Until that happens, Congress should follow the law enacted in 1980 to give it a prominent role in the CG selection. The 1980 law assigns Congress responsibility for initially identifying and vetting CG candidates through a bicameral, bipartisan commission made up of designated congressional leaders and then recommending at least three potential nominees to the president. Past presidents of both parties respected the role of Congress each time the statutory process was used and nominated individuals recommended by the commission. The Trump administration has now turned the statutory process on its head by nominating its own preferred candidate for CG with no input from Congress and pressuring Congress to rubber stamp its choice with virtually no scrutiny.

The current effort clearly flouts the letter and spirit of the law

The president’s nomination of OMB Deputy Director Eric Ueland was reportedly a done deal before Congress became involved in any way. The congressional commission required by law was never activated. A Senate Homeland Security Committee staffer said the outcome was “preordained.”  Committee Chairman Rand Paul acknowledged that the White House told him to recommend Ueland.

All that followed was window dressing. Chairman Paul gave Democrats less than a day to propose any names they wanted. The Republicans who would have served on the congressional commission had there been one sent a letter to the president forthwith “recommending” Ueland to him with two other names added in a transparently spurious attempt to give the appearance of compliance with the law.

On November 16, the president officially nominated Ueland. On November 19, the Homeland Security Committee held a hearing on Ueland’s nomination that was as perfunctory as the rest of the process. He was placed on a panel with six other nominees and only one round of questions was allowed.

The 1980 law has two key objectives: to enhance congressional input into the CG appointment and to ensure that the individual appointed has the bipartisan credibility and support that are essential to serving effectively in that position. The process this time involved zero meaningful congressional input and was entirely and unabashedly partisan. It took place as if the 1980 law did not exist.

It also poses an existential threat to GAO

This is not hyperbole. GAO’s worth as an organization depends on the credibility of its work. It must be, and must be perceived as being, scrupulously objective, fact-based, and nonpartisan in everything it does. Obviously, this requires a CG who has and is readily perceived to have the same attributes. GAO’s fundamental mission is to support Congress in the exercise of its constitutional duties, serving Republicans and Democrats alike. If it loses its credibility, it loses its value to its congressional clients and to the public, which is also a major beneficiary of GAO’s work.

The CG appointment process mandated by law has succeeded in producing highly regarded leaders for GAO who enjoyed broad bipartisan credibility throughout their tenure and upheld the agency’s unblemished reputation. The slapdash, partisan process now underway could undo this. It could also have damaging effects within the agency such as tanking currently high morale, prompting an exodus of valuable staff, and making it difficult to recruit the type of employees who embrace the agency’s ethos.

What’s happening now is wholly unprecedented  

The only meager excuse offered in defense of this process is that Democrats and Republicans sent separate lists of recommendations to the president the last two times CGs were appointed, in 1998 and 2010. True, but the similarity ends there. First, all lists submitted on the prior occasions were the product of real commissions convened as required by the law in which both Democrats and Republicans took the process seriously and worked in good faith to develop and vet candidates. As noted above, there was no commission at all this time and the letter sent to the president can’t be regarded in any sense as a product of the statutory process.

Second, there was much more agreement than disagreement between Democrats and Republicans on both prior occasions even though they wound up sending separate lists. In 1998, Republicans submitted a list of three names to the president; Democrats included all three of those names on their list but added four more. In 2010, Democrats submitted four names; Republicans included three of those names on their list but omitted the fourth. On each occasion, both the Republican and Democratic lists included the eventual appointee.

Eric Ueland’s nomination is problematic on many levels

Any nominee who emerged from the partisan hash of an appointment process now underway would be the object of skepticism.  Mr. Ueland’s nomination is particularly troublesome. While no one (at least nobody I know) questions his character or suggests that he is not a decent and honorable person, his current service at OMB raises many red flags.[2]It’s worth noting that former CG Elmer Staats served as deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget, the predecessor agency to OMB, prior to his appointment; however, that was a very different era. … Continue reading

Spearheaded by OMB, the Trump administration has shown unprecedented resistance and outright hostility to GAO, stonewalling its legitimate information requests, rejecting its legal opinions out of hand, and disparaging it at every turn. Ueland’s boss, OMB Director Russell Vought, has baselessly called GAO a “hyperpartisan” agency whose work, particularly on impoundment, is driven by a political agenda. Vought even insists that GAO “shouldn’t exist.” OMB has also promoted draconian cuts to GAO’s budget.

More broadly, OMB under Vought and Ueland has waged war on Congress’s power of the purse. It asserts that the Impoundment Control Act, which assigns enforcement functions to GAO, is unconstitutional. It has engaged in illegal impoundments, including so-called “pocket rescissions” to delay reporting impoundments to Congress until it is too late for Congress to act on them. It has approved spending money that Congress never appropriated.

Surely Ueland has also had a direct role in a host of policies, decisions, and actions across government that are now or will become the subject of requests for GAO evaluations. How would he handle these situations? Would he need to recuse himself from large portions of GAO’s work?

These and other issues would give any objective, sentient person serious pause about putting Ueland in charge of GAO. At the very least, they cry out to be explored thoroughly rather than brushed off in the current frenetic process. Ueland’s responses to the limited questions he could be asked at his superficial confirmation hearing were hardly reassuring. He ducked questions about GAO’s impoundment work, gave GAO only a “medium” performance grade,[3]Ueland based his mediocre grade on the fact that many major government management problems have languished for years on GAO’s high-risk list. But GAO has no power to fix these problems. On the … Continue reading and claimed that he had only a single passing exchange with Vought about the CG position.

Congress can’t afford to make a mistake

Once appointed, the CG serves a statutory, nonrenewable 15-year term of office. Thus, the next CG’s tenure will span a number of presidential administrations, Congresses, and probably shifts in political power. Also, the law imposes strict limits on the means and grounds for removing the CG. These statutory provisions are designed to ensure the CG’s independence and insulation from political pressure. But they also make it imperative for Congress to invest the effort needed to get the appointment right the first time; it won’t have an opportunity for a redo for 15 years.

At Trump’s insistence, Congress is now poised to do exactly the opposite. Instead, it should just say no and return to the bicameral, bipartisan process required by the 1980 law, which is well suited to making a wise choice. While the process should have started months ago, it’s not too late to initiate it now; nor is there any urgent need to rush it. GAO is currently in the capable hands of Acting Comptroller General Orice Williams Brown, a career GAO employee who embodies GAO’s core values. The commission process could even proceed in tandem with legislation to transfer the CG appointing authority to Congress since it should remain a part of that legislation.

There are encouraging signs that some Republican senators will choose loyalty to Congress as an institution over blind obedience to Trump and stop the mad rush to install Mr. Ueland as CG. If that happens, as it should, Republicans and Democrats must work together in good faith to identify, vet, and recommend candidates who can match the bipartisan support and broad-based credibility of the CGs who came before. Mr. Ueland could still be a candidate for consideration in that process, which would provide the proper venue to explore the many issues over his fitness for CG that are now being shunted aside.

 

Footnotes

Footnotes
↑1 See here and here
↑2 It’s worth noting that former CG Elmer Staats served as deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget, the predecessor agency to OMB, prior to his appointment; however, that was a very different era. The Budget Bureau of his day bore no resemblance to the OMB of today, which has unfortunately become such a highly partisan, ideological, and combative organization under the leadership of Vought and Ueland.
↑3 Ueland based his mediocre grade on the fact that many major government management problems have languished for years on GAO’s high-risk list. But GAO has no power to fix these problems. On the other hand, OMB does have such power. One wonders what grade he would give OMB and himself.

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